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A Small Power’s Strategy: 
Poland and the Ukrainian Crisis of 2004
Jerzy J. Wiatr
Abstract: Political scientists discussed the role of the smaller states in several 
studies published in the 1960s and 70s. They focused on policy choices a small power 
faced when joining multinational alliances and within them. Recently, attention has 
focused on how many a small powers can influence political developments both within 
the alliances they belong to and outside them.
Poland’s involvement in the negotiated solution of the Ukrainian political crisis of 
2004 shows that a smaller power can use its assets to influence events. When the political 
scene in Ukraine polarized between two camps (respectively represented by Prime 
Minister Victor Yanukovych and the opposition leader Victor Yushchenko) Russia 
tried to influence the outcome by giving support to Yanukovych. The United States and 
the European Union remained neutral in the crisis, mostly due to their unwillingness 
to damage their relations with Russia. When the run-off election had been rigged 
and Yushchenko’s supporters began street protests, Polish public opinion solidly 
sided with the Ukrainian opposition. Poland’s President Aleksander Kwasniewski, in 
a series of visits to Kiev, helped both sides of the Ukrainian crisis to reach a negotiated 
compromise. The run-off results were declared void by the Supreme Court and in the 
repeated vote Yushchenko won the presidency. Poland was able to help her neighbour 
to chose a democratic solution to the crisis and continues to support Ukraine’s efforts 
to join the European Union. In the long run such policy serves Poland’s interests but its 
immediate consequence has been a deterioration in Polish-Russian relations. 
Key words: small powers, international strategy, presidential election, orange 
revolution, Ukraine, Poland, Russia, European Union
Introduction
After the Second World War and the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Orga-
nization, political scientists began to investigate the role played by smaller states in in-
ternational relations. Their interest in the strategies chosen by smaller powers reflected 
partly the reality of the world in which so much depended on the few great powers who 
decided on war and peace. Not ignoring the decisive role of the great powers, political 
scientists tried to enlarge the picture by presenting the policies of the smaller states. In 
her pioneering study Annette Baker Fox (1959) made a strong case for the thesis that 
small states’ diplomacy in the Second World War had some impact on the behaviour of 
the great powers and on the final outcome. Conflicts between small and great powers 
have been studied comparatively by David Vital (Vital, 1967, Vital 1971) and their 
role in the multinational alliances has been discussed by Robert Rothstein (1968). In 
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the early 1970s a group of Belgian political scientists from the Catholic University of 
Leuven produced a comparative study of the policies of seven smaller NATO members 
(Portugal, Greece, Turkey, Denmark, Belgium, Holland and Luxembourg), focusing 
on their motives to join the alliance (Raeymaeker et al., 1974). The position of the 
small powers – members of the Soviet dominated Warsaw Pact – has been analysed by 
Robin A. Remington, who pointed to the limited but real possibilities of smaller states’ 
strategies within the fundamentally unequal relationships (Remington, 1971). 
The end of the Cold War, followed by the enlargement of the North Atlantic Tre-
aty Organization and of the European Union, changed the conditions in which small 
powers conduct their foreign policies. The world situation is no longer dominated by 
the rivalry between two superpowers. The danger of the Third World War, at least in 
the way it was feared for almost fifty years, no longer exists. European nations have 
enjoyed security unknown in their history. Twenty-five of them belong to the European 
Union, which has the potential to act as one of the main actors in international 
relations. Within the European Union, most member states are “small powers” in the 
terminology of authors who have introduced this concept to the study of international 
relations. Their impact on the policies of the EU remains to be seen. In spite of the 
technically equal status of all members in the decision-making process within the EU, 
there is strong evidence suggesting that France and Germany, when acting together, are 
by far more influential than other members.
In global relations the United States of America became the only super-power. 
America’s military might, based on a strong economy, modern technology and 
the sustained effort to build up the defence potential, allows the USA to intervene 
militarily even without her allies. After 11 September, American foreign policy took 
a new direction. Military intervention in Iraq, while supported by some of the NATO 
members, has been strongly opposed by many others, including such allies as France 
and Germany. The split within the Alliance resulted in the unprecedented cooperation 
between two NATO powers opposed to the US policy and their former adversary 
Russia.
Small powers in the alliance are now confronted with a new question. Should 
they follow the lead of the by far most powerful member even if such a policy may 
jeopardize their relations with the other powerful members of the European Union? 
Could they find a relatively independent role for themselves within the alliance, which 
no longer speaks the same language? Or should they accept the advice of the French 
President Jacques Chirac to keep their mouth shut? 
The Dilemmas of Poland’s Strategy in the Alliance
From the beginning of the democratic transformation, Poland has opted for close 
association with and ultimately membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
and the European Union. In 1992 the government of Poland officially declared mem-
bership of NATO as the priority goal of defence policy, and in 1994 Poland applied 
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for membership in the European Union. The first goal was reached in March 1999, 
when Poland – along with the Czech Republic and Hungary – became a member of 
NATO and the second – on 1 May, 2004, when ten new members joined the European 
Union. In the last years of the 20th century, when Poland joined NATO, international 
perspectives looked simple and optimistic. Close Polish-American relations were seen 
as the foundation of Poland’s security, while the prospect of becoming a new member 
of the European Union was considered an important element of the strategy aimed at 
the modernization of the country.
The time to choose came in 2003 when Poland decided to actively support the 
US policy of military intervention in Iraq, risking a deterioration of her relations with 
France and Germany, whose opposition to President George W. Bush’s strategy was 
well known. Originally, the choice made by the Polish government had strong support 
in the country, including the main parties of the parliamentary opposition. Critics, 
including myself, predicted an intervention fiasco and objected to taking military 
action without a UN mandate95. With the passing of time the mood of the people has 
changed, largely due to the casualties suffered by the Polish forces in Iraq, the lack of 
progress in the policy of “stabilization” and the news of the brutalities committed by 
the American forces in Iraq. The official policy remained, however, firmly loyal to the 
Polish-American cooperation in Iraq.
Such a strategic option has been combined with firm commitment to the strengthening 
of the European Union. Regardless of their different political colouring, all Polish 
Cabinets have advocated strong commitment to the European Union. In 2003 Poles 
voted in a nationwide referendum on the ratification of the treaty of admission, which 
resulted in a clear victory of the supporters of Poland’s accession. In the campaign 
which preceded the referendum differences within the Union and within NATO were 
deliberately played down as unfortunate misunderstandings between allies. Following 
her admission, Poland has tried not to make a choice between the USA and the 
European Union, but rather to work for the improvement of transatlantic relations.
Poland has also a strong interest in the way in which both NATO and the European 
Union define their policies towards the Eastern part of Europe – Russia and the former 
republics of the USSR. Geographic proximity and history make Poland particularly 
sensitive to the Eastern policies of NATO and EU. Poland very strongly supported 
the Baltic republics in their efforts to become members of both organizations in 
1991. Poland was the first state to recognize the independence of Ukraine. Relations 
between Russia and Poland have been affected by Russia’s prolonged opposition to the 
eastward enlargement of NATO, particularly to Poland’s membership in the Alliance. 
Fortunately, Russian efforts were ignored, and this controversy belongs to the past. 
95 In my early criticism of the plans to invade Iraq (Wiatr, 2002) I made two points. First, invading Iraq without 
UN mandate would violate international law and, therefore, would lead to the weakening of the foundations 
of post-Cold War international relations. Second, while defeating the Iraqi army would be relatively easy, 
establishing peace and order would encounter serious difficulties. I also presented this criticism in a public 
lecture delivered at the UCLA Russian and European Studies Centre in February 2003. 
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Nonetheless, Poland is aware of the potential danger of renewed Russian hegemonic 
policy toward her neighbours. While membership in NATO gives Poland the necessary 
security guarantees, many Poles are afraid that close cooperation between NATO and 
Russia might be considered by some members of the Alliance as more important than 
the interests of Poland. The memories of World War Two are still very much alive 
and are pointed to by those who do not fully trust Poland’s current allies in Europe. 
This is probably the main reason for the way in which most Poles perceive the value 
of close collaboration with the United States. American hegemony is perceived as 
preferable – from a Polish perspective – than the power game played by the strongest 
states in the EU. Not everybody shares such feelings, but to ignore them would make 
understanding of Poland’s policies within the Alliance impossible.
In 2004 the internal political conflict in Ukraine put Poland’s policy to the test. 
Polish public opinion was strongly in favour of the Ukrainian democratic opposition. 
Thousands of Poles manifested their support for the “orange revolution” and many, 
including former President Lech Walesa, went to Kiev to express their solidarity. The 
media, with very few exceptions, commented on the Ukrainian events in a way which 
showed their sympathy for the Ukrainian opposition. More important, however, was 
the political mission undertaken by President Aleksander Kwasniewski, who made 
a successful effort to persuade both sides in the Ukrainian conflict to reach a negotiated 
agreement. The story of this policy provides an insight in the possibilities of a small 
power’s strategy within and outside the alliance.
The historical background
The recent role of Poland in the solution of the Ukrainian political conflict can only 
be understood if the complex Polish-Ukrainian relations are taken into account.
When the Polish-Lithuanian state was established in the 15th century, Ukraine 
became its very special component. The dominant religion of the Ukrainian masses was 
Orthodox, but the aristocracy and nobility converted to Catholicism and amalgamated 
with the Polish nobility. Polonized nobility became the main foundation of the Polish 
rule over Ukraine.
In the 17th century several uprisings of the Ukrainian Kozaks weakened Polish 
rule over Ukraine. The biggest of them, led by Bohdan Khmielnicky (1648) led to the 
de facto independence of Ukraine. In 1654, however, the Kozak Council turned to the 
tsar of Moscow Aleksey Mihailovich for protection against Poland. After more than 
13 years of war, Poland and Russia signed a treaty under which Ukraine was divided. 
Territories to the east of Dnepr (including Kiev) went to Russia, and Polish rule was 
re-established on the rest of Ukraine. The partitions of Poland in the 18th century 
divided Ukraine into two parts. The larger was taken by Russia, while the western part, 
with Lviv (Lwów in Polish) as its centre, became part of the Austrian empire. In late 
19th century western Ukraine became the centre of the Ukrainian national movement. 
After the First World War Ukrainians under the leadership of Semen Petlura made an 
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unsuccessful effort to establish their state in Western Ukraine. Brief fighting between 
Polish and Ukrainian forces over the control of Lviv in the fall of 1918 ended in Polish 
victory. Soon however, the former adversaries joined hands against the common 
enemy – Soviet Russia.
There were two main reasons for the Polish-Soviet war of 1919–1920. The first was 
the Soviet dream of bringing the communist revolution to Central Europe, particularly 
to Germany. This goal could not have been achieved without defeating the newly 
independent Poland. The second reason was Poland’s readiness to help Ukrainians in 
their struggle for independence. The pact of mutual assistance, signed by the Polish 
head of state Józef Piłsudski and the Ukrainian leader Petlura reflected Poland’s 
strategy of building a bloc of independent states, freed from Russian rule and capable 
of common defence. Piłsudski did not aim at the conquest of Ukraine but hoped that an 
independent Ukrainian state allied with Poland would constitute the basis for building 
a broad coalition, or perhaps even a federation, of newly independent states in East-
-Central Europe (Dziewanowski, 1969). The fortunes of war varied. In April 1920 
the Poles captured Kiev but after a few weeks were forced to retreat. In August of the 
same year the Soviet forces arrived at the outskirts of Warsaw but were defeated in the 
battle which the British ambassador Lord d’Abernon (1931) called it “the eighteenth 
decisive battle of the world” .
The war ended in the Peace Treaty of Riga (1921). Poland defended her independence 
but most of Ukraine remained under Soviet control. Western Ukraine became part of 
Poland for the next 18 years. Ukrainian nationalists, outraged by the change in Poland’s 
policy, continued their struggle for independence using terrorist tactics. Polish security 
apparatus responded with repression. Relations between the two nations deteriorated. In 
September 1939 Germany attacked Poland. After 17 days of fighting the Soviet Union, 
acting in agreement with the secret German-Soviet treaty, invaded Poland and incorporated 
the country’s eastern parts. Lviv for the first time in its history came under Russian rule. 
When Germany invaded the USSR and occupied Western Ukraine, Ukrainian nationalists, 
some of whom collaborated with Nazi Germany, organized bloody ethnic cleansing directed 
against Poles, particularly in the province of Wolyn. The memory of the massacres, in 
which about one hundred thousand Poles lost their lives, was the main reason for the 
anti-Ukrainian sentiment in Post-War Poland, deliberately exploited by communist propa-
ganda. At the end of the war, the Teheran (1943) and Yalta (1945) summits recognized the 
Soviet conquests as permanent. Most of the Polish population from Western Ukraine (as 
well as from Western Belarus and from Lithuania) was resettled to Poland. On the Polish 
side of the new frontier several hundred thousand ethnic Ukrainians remained. Some of 
them continued their hopeless guerrilla struggle. In 1947 the Polish authorities forcibly 
resettled all Ukrainians to various localities in the formerly German territories in the west 
and north of the country. Recently, the President of Poland, Aleksander Kwasniewski, 
apologized publicly for this action as a violation of human rights.
During communist rule Polish-Ukrainian relations were largely ignored. The 
official policy of Poland treated Ukraine as part of the USSR. The Polish government 
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in exile (in London) remained firmly committed to the pre-war frontiers and demanded 
that the former eastern territories of Poland be returned. This, inevitably, led to conflict 
with the Ukrainian national movement, opposed to the Soviet rule but unwilling to 
give back lands considered integral parts of historic Ukraine.
Only a small group of Polish emigrants offered a new strategy. In 1974 the main 
political commentator of the monthly Kultura (published in Paris under the editorship 
of Jerzy Giedroyc), Juliusz Mieroszewski, called for the recognition of the new borders 
and for the Polish-Ukrainian cooperation after both nations regains their independence. 
He accused Poles, who expected Poland’s return to the territories lost in the East, of 
unwillingly serving the interests of Soviet imperialism (Mieroszewski, 1974)96. In the 
following years Kultura served as the main centre for collaboration between Polish and 
Ukrainian opponents of the Soviet régime. Its approach to Polish-Ukrainian relations 
has gradually been adopted by a growing number of Poles and after 1989 became the 
intellectual base for democratic Poland’s strategy vis-à-vis Ukraine.
The “Orange Revolution” and Poland’s Strategy 
What came to be called “the orange revolution” was a mass protest staged in Kiev 
and some other Ukrainian cities in protest of the great irregularities that had taken pla-
ce during the second round of the presidential election (21 November 2004). Contrary 
to the results of exits polls, which had predicted the victory of the opposition leader 
Victor Yushchenko, the electoral commission declared the victory of Prime Minister 
Victor Yanukovych. Foreign observers (from the Council of Europe, the European 
Parliament and OSCE) expressed their objections because of numerous irregularities 
during the voting, the most flagrant of which was the multiple voting of Yanukovych’s 
supporters, who were transported from one polling station to the other by means of 
transport provided by the state.
The conflict had an international dimension. Prime Minister Yanukovych represented 
the ruling bloc supporting the incumbent President Leonid Kuchma (who, after having 
served two terms, was no longer eligible). His election would have meant the continuation 
of the political status quo, both internally and in Ukraine’s foreign policy.
Internally, Kuchma’s presidency evolved gradually toward mild authoritarianism. 
Harassment of the opposition and of the independent media increased over time, with 
the kidnapping and assassination of the journalist Georgij Gongadze as the most brutal 
case, for which high-ranking officers of the State Security and even the President him-
self were considered responsible. Corruption and nepotism were flagrant. Economic 
reforms were slowed down and the economy stagnated.
In foreign policy, Kuchma skilfully combined good relations with Russia and the 
membership in the Commonwealth of Independent States with supporting the United 
96 This, however, for them was not a new idea. In the spring of 1957, I had an opportunity to talk to Juliusz 
Mieroszewski in London and Jerzy Giedroyc in Paris. Both made it clear that they hoped for a new 
Polish-Ukrainian relationship after the end of the Soviet hegemony. 
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States in its intervention in Iraq. Kuchma, however, was lukewarm in his position 
towards the European Union. While under his rule Ukraine was willing to cooperate 
with the Union, she was not eager to adjust her internal legal and economic system 
to the requirements of the EU. From Russia’s point of view the continuation of such 
policy was preferable to a clear turn to the West, postulated by most of the opposition. 
Russia’s President Vladimir Putin openly supported the continuation of the status quo 
and even came to Ukraine to give Yanukovych his support. 
The opposition, previously badly divided between numerous parties (from 
Socialists on the Left to nationalists on the Right), united behind a popular former 
Prime Minister Victor Yushchenko, who promised honesty in office, economic reforms 
and closer links to the European Union. The incumbent administration used variety 
of means, including an assassination attempt, to prevent Yushchenko from launching 
an effective campaign. This has not worked and most likely contributed to the streng-
thening of support for the opposition. In the first round of the presidential election 
(31 October 2004) Yushchenko won in the western and central regions (including 
Kiev) but lost in the East and in the South (Crimea), where the Russian-speaking 
population is dominant. The two leading candidates – Yushchenko and Yanukovych 
– advanced to the run-off.97 
When the results of the run-off had been announced (giving Yanukovych 49 per 
cent and Yushchenko 46 per cent of votes), Yushchenko’s supporters took to the streets 
demanding a recount, threatening a general strike and civil disobedience. Wearing 
orange symbols, they for all practical reasons controlled the streets of the capital. 
From Western Ukraine thousands of Yushchenko’s supporters arrived in Kiev. In the 
East, however, Yanukovych’s forces were firmly in control. Coal miners from Eastern 
Ukraine belonged to the most active supporters of the Prime Minister. They were ready 
to march on the capital. In the armed forces and in the security police Yanukovych had 
many supporters but it was far from obvious that they would be ready for a civil war. 
Almost instantly the conflict became internationalized. Not waiting for the official 
declaration of the results, President Putin congratulated Yanukovych and recognized 
him as the new President. This was a premature action, which – seen from the 
perspective of future developments – seriously jeopardized Russia’s position in her 
relations with Ukraine. The most likely interpretation of President Putin’s action is 
that he hoped for the creation of an international momentum in favour of the candidate 
who, from Russia’s point of view, was preferable.
Putin’s strategy could have worked. The great powers were unwilling to 
risk damage in their relations with Russia over an issue not considered to be of 
crucial importance for them. After the 11 September attacks, American-Russian 
97 Ukraine (like Poland and many other states where the president is elected by the people) has adopted 
the French-style system of electing the president. If no candidate wins an absolute majority, two leading 
candidates advance to the run-off, in which a simple majority is required for victory. Such system very 
rarely results in electing the president in the first round. It never happened in France and in Poland only 
once (2000) a candidate won in the first round (Aleksander Kwasniewski seeking re-election). 
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relations visibly improved because of strong support Putin gave to President George 
W. Bush’s “war on terrorism”. For a different reason, France and Germany were 
eager to cultivate close collaboration with Russia in which they saw an instrument 
of counter-balancing the American world hegemony. Generally speaking, the great 
powers of NATO and the European Union were willing to tacitly accept the special 
position of Russia within the CIS. They were not inclined to get involved in the 
internal Ukrainian conflict.
Poland was in a different position. Internally, there was a strong solidarity feeling 
with the Ukrainian democratic opposition, seen by many as a replication of the Polish 
one twenty years before. Lech Walesa‘s appearance in Kiev and his emotional speech 
in support of free and honest elections symbolized this aspect of the Polish reaction. 
It would have been difficult for the Polish government to ignore the sentiment of the 
Polish people. Moreover, indifference towards the Ukrainian crisis would have been 
contrary to Poland’s long-standing commitment to support Ukraine’s democratic 
transformation and her closer links to the West. When President Kwasniewski decided 
to take a political initiative in the Ukrainian crisis, he acted out of the conviction 
expressed 30 years earlier in the Kultura article, that an independent Ukraine would 
also be vitally important for Poland’s security. 
Diplomatically, Poland has very few assets to make use of. As member of the Euro-
pean Union she made an effort to mobilize support for an international mediation in the 
Ukrainian conflict, but reaction from most of the member states was not particularly 
supportive. The foreign policy spokesman of the EU Javier Solana arrived in Kiev, 
but only after the mediation undertaken by President Kwasniewski had begun to bring 
results.
Doing nothing would have been easy, but would have caused two negative 
consequences. Domestically, a lack of action would have been interpreted as a sign 
of weakness and would have negatively affected the position of the Polish President. 
Since, however, he is serving his second and last term; such a consideration was not of 
the greatest importance. Internationally, accepting the Russian strategy in the Ukraine 
would have destroyed Poland’s hopes for closer cooperation with Ukraine and for her 
future accession to the European Union, an option firmly supported by Poland.
The decision to become involved called for a delicate diplomatic game. President 
Kwasniewski has not committed himself to any of the competing candidates but came 
to Kiev as a neutral broker. His main asset was a good personal relationship with all 
major players, including President Leonid Kuchma and both contenders. Realizing 
the danger of an armed confrontation, Kuchma was ready to seek a compromise. 
Since his own position had been weakened by the support he had given to Victor 
Yanukovych and by the wrongdoings of his administration, he looked for somebody 
who could open the door to a compromise solution. Aleksander Kwasniewski was an 
ideal candidate for such a role. Not only was he highly respected in all major quarters 
of the Ukrainian political scene, he had been also one of the architects of the Polish 
Round Table agreement of 1989, which was seen as a prototype for negotiated reform 
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in the formerly communist states98. He was able to communicate without interpretation 
and often used informal language to lower tensions between Ukrainian contenders. At 
some point, the Lithuanian President Valdas Adamkus joined the negotiations, but the 
main role belonged to Aleksander Kwasniewski. 
The beginning of the talks was not very promising. Yanukovych insisted on the 
recognition of his victory and found encouragement in Russia’s clearly worded sup-
port. On the other side, Yushchenko demanded that the electoral commission change 
its original ruling and declare him the winner. Supported by the demonstrators, he 
even entered the hall of the Parliament and delivered something that sounded like the 
presidential oath. Kuchma demanded that the demonstrators leave the streets before 
any solution would be negotiated. This was unacceptable for Yushchenko’s supporters, 
who knew that their strength was in their determination.
The critical point came when information reached President Kwasniewski that 
units of the army loyal to President Kuchma and Prime Minister Yanukovych were 
approaching Kiev. An armed confrontation with the crowds would have resulted in 
civil war and most likely in the split between Eastern Ukraine, controlled by forces 
loyal to Yanukovych, and the rest of the country. Ukraine could have easily experienced 
a repeat of the Yugoslav tragedy.
There were several reasons why such a disaster was avoided. The courageous stand 
of the demonstrators sent a clear message that military intervention would not be 
without cost. Elements of the security police, probably better understanding the situation, 
were ready to oppose the approaching military, and the cohesion of the armed forces 
could not have been taken for granted. And there was the Polish President, who in 
a series of desperate last minute calls, persuaded Kuchma and Yanukovych to abandon 
their plans.
What happened later was a complex process of reaching an agreement. The 
“zero option” suggested originally by Kuchma (annulment of the whole election and 
organizing a new one) was rejected as – according to Ukrainian law – it would have 
prevented both Yanukovych and Yushchenko from running again. The negotiators 
agreed to refer the matter to the Supreme Court, which ruled that the verdict of the 
Electoral Commission was based on partly falsified results and declared it void. 
This opened the door to the replication of the run-off. Since both candidates claimed 
victory, Kwasniewski was able to argue that they should accept the new run-off in 
which they would be able to prove their case. The Supreme Court’s ruling weakened 
the position of Prime Minister Yanukovych, since it was obvious to everybody that the 
head of the government was responsible for falsification of electoral results showing 
98 In 1989 Aleksander Kwasniewski was the minister without portfolio and chairman of the political com-
mittee in the Cabinet headed by Prime Minister Mieczyslaw F. Rakowski. Together with future Prime 
Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki he co-chaired the sub-committee on trade unions of the Round Table 
and was one of the principal negotiators from the government side. He had proposed several specific 
agreements, which the Round Table conference eventually included in the final accord. Elected President 
of Poland in 1995, he was able to include prominent people from the former democratic opposition in his 
administration. 
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in his favour. Yanukovych submitted his resignation, but President Kuchma decided to 
keep the cabinet in the caretaker capacity.
On 26 December 2004 Ukrainians elected Yushchenko their new President. The 
pattern of the voting was as it was before, with Yanukovych winning in the East and 
South and Yushchenko in the Centre and West. This time, however, there were no 
irregularities and the will of the majority found its expression in the official results. 
The “orange revolution” has won.
Conclusion
Following the inauguration of President Yushchenko relations between Ukraine 
and Russia normalized. The new president declared his willingness to cooperate 
with Russia but he also made it clear that under his leadership Ukraine would seek 
closer ties with and eventually membership in the European Union. Risking Russia’s 
displeasure, he appointed Julia Timoshenko, an outspoken critic of President Putin’s 
policy, as new Prime Minister. Ukraine is looking for solutions which would make the 
Commonwealth less dependent on Russia. It is cooperating with Georgia and Moldova 
who, like Ukraine, are members of the CIS. Such a policy cannot be welcome in 
Moscow, but President Putin tried to reduce damage done by his previous involvement 
in the Ukrainian election and declared his readiness to maintain good relations with the 
second biggest nation of the former USSR.
Poland, on the other hand, has been singled out for Russian displeasure. In diplo-
matically rare personal attack, President Putin criticized President Kwasniewski for 
involving himself in matters which did not relate to him. There have been comments 
about Poland in the Russian media, as there were critical comments on Russia’s 
policy in Polish equivalents. At the level of public diplomacy relations between 
two states have deteriorated to the lowest level since the beginning of democratic 
transformation.
This puts Poland in a difficult position. Conflict with Russia is the last thing Poland 
needs in her present position as a member of NATO and of the European Union. Both 
organizations seek cooperation in Russia and would not be happy if a small power like 
Poland complicates this cooperation. The strategy followed by Poland in the Ukrainian 
crisis can work, however, if it is followed by sustained action in favour of building 
closer links between Ukraine and the European Union. Poland has already declared 
herself in favour of admitting Ukraine to the EU in the shortest possible time. Such 
a decision would not only be in Poland’s interest (and, what is more important, in the 
interest of Ukraine) but also in the interest of the European Union. The great potential 
of Ukraine would in the long run make Europe stronger, and bringing Ukraine to the 
Union would definitely preclude any possibility of renewed Russian hegemony. This, 
by the way, would also be in the best interest of Russia. Unfortunately, it probably 
will take time for the Russian leaders and general public to recognize that as a great 
regional power Russia can serve her national interest best not by trying to rebuild 
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the empire but by building cooperative relations with the transatlantic community 
as a whole. This would mean cooperating not only with the USA and with the great 
European powers, but also with small powers in the alliance.
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